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SKEPTICS PHILOSOPHERS |
THEMES ON THIS PAGE:
| 1. SEXTUS EMPIRICUS | 2. . PYRRHO | 3. CARNEADES |
SKEPTICS PHILOSOPHERS
The Skeptic school of philosophy was founded by the Greek philosopher Pyrrho in the 4th-3rd century BC, and flourished for several centuries alongside Stoicism, Epicureanism, and New-Platonism, all of which regarded philosophy as a practical activity and a way of life. The main goal of Skeptic philosophers was to achieve ATARAXIA, which is a state of inner quietude, tranquility, absence of perturbation. This is not just a momentary experience but a general state of mind, which must be cultivated through repeated techniques and exercises. For the Skeptics, judgements (“dogmas,” opinions, interpretations) are the main reason for worry and perturbation, and they should be avoided – but not all of them. Skeptics distinguished between experiences and judgements, in other words between the phenomenal and the intellectual: Direct experiences are evident (for example: “I now feel pain”) and cannot be doubted, while judgements are not evident and should be avoided. Through the suspension of judgements – EPOCHÉ – our mind attains quietude. For this purpose, the skeptics developed a list of arguments designed to counter any statement and show that its opposite is just as evident. (For example, “It is hot now” is based on human sensitivities, and for other animals it is cold now.)
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1. SEXTUS EMPIRICUS – QUIETUDE THROUGH SUSPENSION OF JUDGEMENT |
Sextus Empiricus (2nd-3rd Centuries), was a philosopher and medical doctor who belonged to the ancient Hellenistic school of philosophy called Skepticism, also called Pyrrhonism since it was founded by Pyrrho about 500 earlier. In medicine he belonged to the so-called school of “Empiricism” (one of the three main schools of medicine at that time), and that is why Sextus is called “Empiricus.”
Sextus’ writings are our main source of knowledge about the ancient school of Skepticism. But about his life almost nothing is known, not even where and when exactly he lived. The following text is slightly adapted from his book Outlines of Pyrrhonism.
CHAPTER 4: What is Skepticism?
Skepticism is the attempt to develop the ability, or the mental attitude, in which we oppose appearances to judgements in many different ways, and by creating an equilibrium between opposite reasons (or things), we reach the state of suspension of judgment (Epoché), and then the state of quietude (Ataraxia).
CHAPTER 6: The Origin of Skepticism
The origin of Skepticism is the hope of reaching Ataraxia. Talented people were disturbed by the contradictions of things, and they doubted which things are true and which are false, and they investigated this, hoping to reach a decision and attain Ataraxia. The fundamental principle of the Skeptical system is to oppose every statement by an opposite statement of an equal power. We believe that as a result we will eventually reach a state in which we stop to dogmatize.
CHAPTER 10: Do the Skeptics deny appearances?
Those who say that the Skeptics deny the phenomena – the way things appear – seem ignorant of our teachings. Because as I said before, we do not deny that we have certain experiences, which we are forced to accept. However, when we ask whether the object really is as it appears to be, we accept that it appears so and so, and we doubt not the appearance itself but rather the judgement about that appearance. This is different from doubting the appearance itself.
For example, it appears to us that honey is sweet. This we accept, because we experience sweetness through our sensation. However, we doubt whether it is sweet in its essence, which is not a question of appearance but of a judgement about the appearance. […]
CHAPTER 12: What is the aim of Skepticism?
[…] When the skeptic began to philosophize about appearances in order to understand which of them are true and which are false, in order to find Ataraxia, he encountered contradictions between equivalent considerations. And since he could not judge, he suspended his judgement. And while he was suspended in this way, Ataraxia came, as if by chance, regarding matters of opinion. Because somebody who believes that anything is either good or bad by nature is always disturbed. When he does not have the things that seem to him good, he thinks that he is tormented by the things which are naturally bad, and he pursues those that he thinks are good. When he acquires them, however, he is even more agitated, because of his irrational and immoderate excitement. And since he fears that his good fortune will change, he does everything in his power to avoid losing the things that seem to him good. On the other hand, a person who judges nothing about what is good or bad doesn’t try to avoid or pursue anything so eagerly, and as a result he is undisturbed.
What happened to the Skeptic is like the story about what happened to the painter Apelles. Once, they say, when he was painting a horse, he wanted to paint the foam of its mouth. But he was so unsuccessful that he threw at the painting the sponge which he had used to wipe off the colors. And the mark of the sponge produced the effect of a horse’s foam.
Nevertheless, we do not consider the Skeptic completely untroubled, because he is troubled by experiences that are unavoidable. We grant that sometimes he is cold and thirsty, and that he suffers in various similar ways. But even so, whereas ordinary people suffer in two ways – both from the experience itself, and from the thought that these conditions are bad by nature – the Skeptic escapes with less discomfort. Because he rejects the additional belief that those conditions are bad by nature. Therefore, we say that in matters of opinion the aim of the Skeptic is quietude (Ataraxia), and in unavoidable things his aim is moderation of feeling.
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2. PYRRHO - APPEARANCE VERSUS REALITY |
Pyrrho (about 360-270 BC) was the founder of the Skeptic school of philosophy, which flourished for several centuries in the ancient world. Since he left us no writings, we must rely on the accounts of later writers, such as Diogenes Laërtus (3rd century AD), a later biographer of Greek philosophers
In the text below, Diogenes Laërtus tells us about Pyrrho’s life, and then explains the philosophical views which he and his students held. According to this account, the focus of the Skeptics was the distinction between the way things appear and the way they are, in other words between the phenomenon and reality, between our experience and the causes of this experience. According to Pyrrho and his students, we cannot deny our experience, but we must not accept any theory (or “dogma”) about what lies beyond our experience. In this respect the Skeptics saw themselves as different from “dogmatic philosophers” – in other words, all the other philosophers who believed in a specific dogma about the world.
Pyrrho of Elis was the son of Pleistarchus. […] He joined Anaxarchus and accompanied him on his travels everywhere, so that he spent time with the Indian Gymnosophists (“naked philosophers”) and with the Magi. As a result, he adopted a philosophy of agnosticism and suspension of judgement. He denied that anything was honorable or dishonorable, just or unjust. And he held that there is nothing that really exists, except custom and convention that govern human action, because no single thing is in itself any more this than that.
He led a life consistent with this doctrine, making no special effort for anything, taking no precaution, but facing all risks when they came, whether wagons, cliffs, dogs or what not, and leaving nothing to judgement about the senses. But he was guarded by his friends who (as Antigonus of Carystus tells us) used to follow close after him. However, Aenesidemus says that only his philosophy was based upon suspension of judgement, and that in his everyday behavior he did not lack carefulness. He lived to be almost ninety years old.
[…] Pyrrho would withdraw from the world and live in solitude, and only rarely show himself to his relatives. He did this because he had heard an Indian man reproach Anaxarchus, telling him that he would never be able to teach others what is good as long as he was eager to serve kings in their courts. […] When a dog rushed at him and terrified him, he answered his critic that it was not easy to get rid completely of human weakness.
[…] His followers were called Pyrrhoneans after the name of their master, but also Aporetics, Skeptics, Ephectics, and even Zetetics, because of their principles (if we may call them principles). Zetetics or seekers – because they were always seeking truth. Skeptics – because they were always looking for a solution and never finding one. Ephectics or doubters – because of the state of mind which they had in their inquiry: suspense of judgement. And finally, Aporetics or those in perplexity – because not only they but even the dogmatic philosophers were often perplexed.
[…]
The Skeptics were constantly engaged in rejecting the dogmas of all schools of philosophy, but they themselves declared no dogma. And although they would present and explain the dogmas of the others, they themselves determined nothing definite.
[…]
This was the sort of interpretation they used to give: Although things appear to be such and such, they are not such in reality but only appear so. And they would say that they were interested not in thoughts, since thoughts are evidently just thought, but in what is involved in sensation. […] They would first show the reasons for believing in something, and then by the same methods they would destroy the belief in it. […] They would show that the probabilities on both sides are equal.
[…]
The dogmatic philosophers argue that the Skeptics throw away life itself, because they reject everything that life consists of. The Skeptics respond that this is false, because they do not deny that we see, they only say that they do not know how we see. "We admit the way things appear," they say, "without admitting that they really are what they appear to be." For example, we perceive a fire burning, but we suspend judgement whether it is its nature to burn. We see that a man moves, and that he perishes, but we do not know how this happens. We only object to accepting the unknown substance behind the appearance.
[…]
For them, the goal is suspension of judgement, which brings with it tranquility like its shadow – so Timon and Aenesidemus declare.
Because in matters in which we can decide, we will neither choose this nor avoid that. And things which are not for us to decide but happen by necessity, such as hunger, thirst and pain, we cannot escape, because they cannot be removed by the force of reason. The dogmatists argue that if you have this frame of mind, you would be willing to kill and eat your own father if you are ordered to do so; and the Skeptic replies that he will be able to suspend his judgement when the issue is arriving at the truth, but not in matters of life and the taking of precautions. Therefore we may choose a thing or avoid it by habit, and follow rules and customs.
According to some authorities, the goal of the Skeptics is insensibility; according to others, gentleness.
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3. CARNEADES – PERSUASIVE BUT NOT TRUE |
Plato founded his Academy in Athens in 387 BC, but less than a century later, in the third century BC, the Academy became dominated by Skeptic philosophers, and remained so until it was destroyed in 86 BC in the Mithriadic War during the conquest of Athens.
The Academic Skeptics rejected the possibility of knowledge, and they debated with the Stoic philosophers who believed they had knowledge about life and the universe, based on impressions (perceptions, experiences) that are “cataleptic” or evidently true. The Skeptics’ main argument against them was that “cataleptic” impressions do not exist because we cannot distinguish between impressions that are true and impressions that appear similar but are in fact false (a hallucination, an imitation, a trick of light, etc.). For example, if you perceive a dog, you have a perception of a dog which you cannot distinguish from an illusion of a dog. Thus, you can never be sure whether your perception is true or false.
The Stoic responded with their own counter-arguments, one of which was that this radical skepticism contradicts real life. You cannot live life if you do not accept most of your experiences as true, and as a basis for your decisions and behavior. For example, when we see bread on our plate we eat it, when we see a dog attacking us we run away, and when we see friends we speak with them, without doubting our perceptions.
Several Skeptic thinkers offered various responses to this argument. One of them was Carneades of Cyrene (214-129 BC), who served as head of the Platonic Academy in the second century BC. Carneades left no writings, but his views were recorded by the Roman philosopher and politician Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC).
The text below is adapted (some small details ignored) from Cicero’s book On Academic Skepticism, which is structured as a dialogue between several people, among them Cicero himself, who seemed to support a mild form of Skepticism. Here Carneades (as quoted by his student Clitomachus, who is quoted by Cicero) responds to the issue by distinguishing between two kinds of impressions (perceptions): those that are evidently true and those that are “persuasive.” Evidently true impression do not exist – hence knowledge is impossible, yet some impressions are “persuasive” in the sense that it is legitimate to rely on them as working hypotheses. They are practically useful, even though they do not constitute real knowledge. This idea is not surprising, explains Carneades, because as a matter of fact everybody uses it. In everyday life we often rely on hypotheses that are not certain: For example, we take a boat even though we are not absolutely sure that it will reach our destination.
[Cicero speaking to the military general Lucullus:]
Carneades’ view is that there are two categories of impressions. The first is the distinction between impressions that are evidently true and those that are not, the second is between impressions that are persuasive and those that are not. […] While there are no impressions that are evidently true, there are many that we may legitimately approve. It would be contrary to nature if there were no persuasive impressions, and the result would be the complete disruption of life, as you, Lucullus, remarked.
So, many perceptual impressions deserve our approval, as long as we remember that for each one of them there is a false impression that is not different from it at all. Thus, the wise person will use whatever strikes him as persuasive, if nothing contradicts its persuasiveness, and the whole structure of his life will be governed in this way. After all, the wise person that you have in mind follows in many cases persuasive impressions that are not evidently true, but are truth-like.
Indeed, if he didn’t approve them, his whole life would be undermined. Here is one example: When the wise man steps into a boat, does he know for sure that he will arrive? How could he possibly be sure? Still, if he goes from here to Puteoli, thirty Stades away [=about 5.5 km], in a tested vessel, with a good navigator, and in calm weather like this, he would have the persuasive impression that he will arrive there safely. So he will deliberate about what to do or not to do on the basis of impressions of this type. […]
Thus, anything that gives him a persuasive impression without a problem will move him to act. He is not made of stone or wood – he has a body and a mind and he is motivated to think and perceive. So he has many true impressions, but these impressions don’t have that distinctive and peculiar sign of evident truth which you require. Thus, in Carneades’ view, the wise person doesn’t agree that this is a true impression, because a false impression could happen that is exactly the same as the true one.
[…]
Still, Lucullus, we should certainly try to deal with the objections that you keep waving at us: “Are you really saying that you don’t understand anything? Are you saying that you can’t hear anything? That nothing is clear to you?” I explained a bit earlier how Carneades dealt with these objections. Now listen to the way his student Clitomachus deals with these topics in the book he wrote for the poet Gaius Lucilius […]: “The Academics hold that there are dissimilarities between things, so that some of them give rise to persuasive impressions, and some don’t. Nevertheless, this does not mean that some impressions are evidently true while others aren’t, because many false impressions are persuasive too, and something false is not something you can know. So, he says, people who claim that the Academics rob them of the senses are completely mistaken. The Academics never claimed that there is no color, flavor, or sound. What they argued was that such things do not have a distinctive mark of truth or certainty.”
[…]
The wise person I am talking about will see the sky, the earth, and the sea with the same eyes as the sage you mentioned, and he will perceive everything else in the same senses. This patch of sea over there, which now looks dark when there is west wind, will look the same to our wise person. Yet, he will not accept this impression as true because a moment ago it looked green, and it will look gray in the morning. And the patch that is glowing where the sun is shining is unlike the patch that is right next to it. So even if you could give an explanation for this, you still couldn’t defend the claim that the visual impression which you had is true.
