An issue for reflection WHO AM I?
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- I am a lucky man. I have a healthy body, I have a stable personality, a good head on my shoulders. I even have a beautiful name, don’t you think so?
- And good genes too.
- Definitely. I could have been born with a weak body, or with a confused personality, or with no talent, or with a stupid name.
- Indeed. But tell me, who is this fortunate “I” who has all those wonderful gifts?
- Me, of course. This body is mine, my personality is mine, my talents are mine, my name is mine. I am the owner of all of these things.
- But who is this owner? Who is this “I”? If he is not your body, not your psychology or talents, not even your name or DNA, then who is he?
- I am I. I can feel myself within me. I know who I am, even if I can’t see it, or touch it, or define it in words!
- You are a very mysterious thing, then. Can others ever know you?
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May Week 1 quotation
RENÉ DESCARTES
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I am a thing which thinks René Descartes (1596-1650), an important French philosopher, mathematician, and scientist, is considered the father of modern philosophy. Under his influence, philosophy became centered on epistemology (the study of knowledge) for three centuries. The question “What do I really know?” became a starting point for many philosophies after him. Especially influential were his idea that knowledge of the self is the foundation of all other knowledge, the search for the foundation of knowledge (foundationalism), and the mind-body problem in its modern form. He also produced important works in mathematics, geometry, and science. As a young man Descartes studied law, then decided to become a professional military officer. While studying military engineering, he studied mathematics and science, and started thinking about a method for scientific knowledge. He then left the military, and continued studying in various places in Europe, meeting and corresponding with important scholars, and teaching. He published works in mathematics and philosophy, some of which were disliked by religious authorities. In 1649 he was invited by Queen Christina of Sweden, and started giving to her lessons in early morning, in cold weather. He soon contracted pneumonia and died.
The following passages are adapted from Descartes’ book Meditations on the First Philosophy (1641). In this book, composed of six “meditations” or chapters, he searches for a foundation of all knowledge. He starts by refusing to believe anything which is not completely certain, including his memory, his belief that the objects he sees around him really exist, and that he has a human body (he might be dreaming, or tricked by an evil deceiver). In the second meditation he finds that the only thing which he knows for sure is that he himself exists. But since his body is still in doubt, he concludes that he is a thinking being. On the basis of this knowledge, Descartes builds, in later meditations, other pieces of knowledge: that God exists, that the material world outside him exists, and the nature of material objects and of the soul.
From MEDITATION 2
Yesterday’s meditations filled my mind with so many doubts that I can no longer forget them. And yet, I do not see how I can resolve them. […] I will continue by putting aside everything which I can doubt with the smallest doubt, as if it is absolutely false. And I will follow this road until I find something that is certain, or at least – if I can do nothing else – until I learn for certain that there is nothing in the world that is certain. […] I am assuming, then, that all the things that I see are false. I am persuading myself that my memory is false, and that nothing which it presents to me has ever existed. I consider that I have no true perceptions. I imagine that body, figure, extension, movement, and place – all of these are only fictions of my mind. What, then, can I regard as true? […] But I myself, am I at least something? I have already denied that I have perceptions and body. Yet I hesitate, because what follows from that? Am I so dependent on body and perceptions that I cannot exist without them? But I was persuaded that there is nothing in the whole world, that no heaven exists, no earth, that there are no minds, nor any bodies – wasn’t I similarly persuaded that I do not exist? Not at all. Certainly I exist, since I persuaded myself of something. Perhaps there is a deceiver, very powerful and very cunning, who always uses his cleverness to deceive me – but then, without doubt I exist even if he deceives me. Let him deceive me as much as he wants, he can never make me nothing as long as I think that I am something. So, after reflecting well, and carefully examining everything, we must come to the definite conclusion that this statement – I am, I exist – is necessarily true each time I pronounce it, or mentally think it. But I do not yet know enough what I am, I who am certain that I am.
[…] I am, I exist – that is certain. But how often? Just when I think. Because it is possible that if I stop thinking entirely, I would stop existing. I do not admit now anything which is not necessarily true. Speaking precisely, I am not more than a thing which thinks. In other words, I am a mind, or a soul, or an understanding, or a reason – which are notions whose significance I did not previously know. I am, however, a real thing and I really exist. But what kind of thing? I have just given the answer: I am a thing which thinks. […] But what, then, am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, and which also imagines and feels.
[…] Finally, I am the one who feels, in other words who perceives certain things, as if by the sense organs, because in fact I see light, I hear noise, I feel heat. But it will be said that these phenomena are false and that I am dreaming. Let it be so, still it is certain that it seems to me that I see light, it seems to me that I hear noise, and it seems to me that I feel heat. That cannot be false. Properly speaking, this, in me, is called feeling. And precisely speaking, it is a form of thinking.
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May Week 2 quotation
DAVID HUME
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The self as a bundle of experiences David Hume (1711-1776) was a major figure in modern philosophy, one the three main British Empiricists of the 18th century (together with John Locke and George Berkeley). He grew up in Edinburgh, where he also studied at university. At the age of 28, after four years of writing, he finished his book Treatise of Human Nature, hoping to make some money out of it, since he was quite poor. Unfortunately, the book was not well received, although later it had an immense influence on the history of philosophy. Some additional texts he wrote did not see much success either. His second major philosophy book, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, was a little more successful. He continued to have financial difficulties, and to search for jobs and sources of income. Only after he published his six volumes on the history of England did he achieve success, and some of the volumes became best sellers. He died from cancer at the age of 65.
The following text is adapted (English simplified in several places) from the section “On Personal Identity” in David Hume’s first philosophy book Treatise of Human Nature (Book 1, Part 4, section 6). Here he argues, against Descartes and others like him, that there is no entity that is the “self.” If my self is supposed to be an entity that is simple (not made of parts), and that is stable and continuous and preserves my personal identify through time, then there is no such thing. According to Hume’s Empiricist approach, every intelligible idea must come from “impressions” — experiences of color and shape, of sound, touch, coldness, warmth, pain, pleasure, etc. However, if I look at my consciousness, I find no stable experience of a self — no impression of anything stable, only a stream of impressions which keep changing and replacing each other. Our consciousness is a “theater” with no observer, with no “owner,” no “I.” What, then, am I? I am a stream of experiences, a bundle of “impressions.”
There are philosophers who imagine that at every moment we are intimately conscious of what we call our "self," that we feel its existence and continuance, and that we are certain, beyond any need for proof, of its perfect identity and simplicity. […] Unluckily, all these statements are contrary to the experience which is used to support them, and we do not have any idea of self as they explain it. Because, from what impression could this idea be derived? This question it is impossible to answer without obvious contradiction and absurdity, and yet it is a question which must be answered if we want the idea of self to be clear and intelligible. It must be one impression that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not one impression, but something that several impressions and ideas are supposed to refer to. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue unchanged through our lives, since the self is supposed to exist in this manner. But there is no impression that is constant and unchanging. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations follow each other, and never exist all of them at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is derived. Consequently there is no such idea.
[…] For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call "myself," I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and can never observe anything except the perception. […] If anyone, upon serious and unprejudiced reflection, thinks that he has a different notion of himself, then I must confess that I can no longer reason with him. All I can allow him is that he may be right just as I am, and that we are essentially different in this respect. He may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continued which he calls himself, although I am certain that there is no such principle in me. But putting aside these metaphysicians, I may say about the rest of humankind that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which follow each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a constant flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in our sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is even more variable than our sight, and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change. There is no single power of the soul which remains unalterably the same, perhaps even for one moment. The mind is a kind of theater, where several perceptions appear one after the other, pass, re-pass, glide away, and mix in an infinite variety of positions and situations. There is no simplicity in it at any one time, nor identity in the differences, whatever natural tendency we may have to imagine this simplicity and identity. The comparison to a theater must not mislead us. Only the succession of perceptions constitute the mind.
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May Week 3 quotation
MAX STIRNER
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I am my own unique me Max Stirner (1806-1856) was a German philosopher. His writings contain early existentialist, nihilist, and anarchist themes. He was born in Bavaria, and studied at the University of Berlin, where he attended lectures by Hegel and others. He became involved with a group of young thinkers which also included Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. For a living, he taught at a school for young girls. He died as a result of infection after an insect bite. No picture of Stirner is known to exist, only a portrait sketched by his friend.
The following passages are adapted from Stirner’s major book The Ego and Its Own (1844). In this peculiar book, Stirner argues that the self cannot be defined or described. Any concept that you might want to apply to me, is not really part of who I am. I am completely unique, and no general concept can capture me. I may be blond, but “blond” is not part of my essence, part of who I really am. I may be happy, but “happy” is not part of who I really am. I may be a man, but “man” or even “human” is not part of who I really am. Therefore, my self cannot be defined, and it is beyond all general descriptions. You may compare my hair-color to your hair-color, or my human body to your human body, but you cannot compare my self to other selves. I am completely unique. For Stirner, this has important practical implications. Indeed, much of the book criticizes various political, social and religious ideologies (liberalism, communism, Christianity, etc.). One implication is regarding personal freedom: Instead of trying to be “free” from this thing or from that thing, I should throw away everything that is not really me (which is almost everything), and in this way “own” myself and only myself. Another implication is that I do not have any obligation to God or society or even humanity, since I am not really part of humankind. Stirner argues that religions and ideologies impose on me false identities (you are “human,” “Christian,” “German,” etc.), and he calls these false identities “ghosts.”
From Part 1, Chapter 2
If you are greater than other humans, this is not by being human, but because you are a “unique” human. Of course, you showed what a human can do, but the fact that you – a human – did it, does not show that other humans can do it. You have done it only as a UNIQUE human, and in this you are unique. It is not your being human that creates your greatness, but YOU create it, because you are more than human, and more powerful than other humans. It is believed that one cannot be more than human. In fact, one cannot be less than human! […]
But although the individual is not human, nevertheless the human is present in the individual, and, like every ghost, has existence in him. […] I was not able to find myself as long as I searched for myself as human. But now that it appears that the human aspires to become I and to be embodied in me, I note that everything depends on me after all, and without me the human is lost.
[…] Well, I do not count myself as anything specific, only as unique. Certainly, I have similarity with others, yet this is true only for comparison or reflection. In fact, I am incomparable, unique. My body is not their body, my mind is not their mind. If you bring them under the generalities of “body” or “mind,” then those concepts have nothing to do with MY body, MY mind. From Part 2, Chapter 1 Ownness is my whole being and existence, it is I myself. I am free from what I am rid of, owner of what I have in my power or what I control. I am my own at all times and under all circumstances, if I know how to have myself, and if I do not throw myself away to depend on others. […] If your efforts always make “freedom” the issue, then you should follow fully the demands of freedom. Who is it that should become free? You, I, we. Free from what? From everything that is not you, not I, not we. Therefore, I am the kernel that should be liberated from all covers and freed from all limiting shells. What is left when I am freed from everything that is not I? Only I, nothing but I. From Chapter 3 For the egoist [the owner of his ego], only HIS history has value, because he wants to develop only HIMSELF, not the concept of humankind, not God’s plan, not the purpose of Providence, not liberty, etc. He does not regard himself as a tool of an idea, or as a vessel of God. He acknowledges no vocation, he does not think that he exists in order to develop humankind, and that he must contribute to it. Rather, he lives himself out, and does not care whether his humanity is doing well or badly. […] They say about God, “Names do not name you.” This applies to me: No concepts express me, nothing that is described as my essence summarizes me – these are only names. Likewise, they say about God that he is perfect and has no need to seek perfection. That, too, applies to me alone. I am the owner of my power, and I am so when I know myself as unique. In his uniqueness, the owner of himself returns into his own creative nothingness, out of which he is born. Every higher essence above me, whether it is god or human, weakens my sense of uniqueness, and it pales only before the sun of this consciousness. If I concern myself with myself as the unique one, then my concern focuses on the temporary and mortal creator of myself, who consumes himself. And I may say: All things are nothing to me.
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May Week 4 quotation
MAURICE MEARLEAU-PONTY
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I live in my body Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) was a French philosopher, known for his work on the philosophy of the body. He studied philosophy at École Normale Supérieure in Paris. He then taught at several academic institutions, and eventually became Chair of Philosophy at Collège de France. He died of a stroke at the age of 53.
Merleau-Ponty was an important phenomenologist. Phenomenology is a philosophical movement of the first half of the 20th century, founded by Edmund Husserl. Its basic idea is that experience is the foundation of our world. For example, to learn about the fundamental nature of time, you need to investigate the experience of time. Merleau-Ponty took phenomenology in a new direction, pointing out the centrality of the body in our experience. According to him, I experience myself as living in my body, as acting through my body. It is through my body that I can move in space, touch objects, and interact with others. My experiences are not private representations in a private mind, but primarily action in the world.
The following passages are adapted from Merleau-Ponty’s main book Phenomenology of Perception (1945). When reading them, note the following important themes: First, I do not experience my body as an object in space – rather, I inhabit my body, I act through my body, I encounter the world through my body. Second, my body knows how to move and act – I do not have to calculate how to move it. My body has body-knowledge. Third, the world which I experience is a public world, not a private representation inside my mind.
From Part 1, Chapter 3 We must not say that our body is IN space, or IN time. It INHABITS space and time. If my hands make a complicated path in the air, I do not have to add together all the movements in one direction and subtract those in the opposite direction. […] Insofar as I have a body through which I act in the world, space and time are not a collection of points for me, nor are they many relations unified by my consciousness, which places my body among them. I am not IN space and time, nor do I conceive space and time. I BELONG to them, my body combines with them and includes them. […] It is possible to know how to type without being able to say where the letters are found on the keyboard. To know how to type is not to know the location of each letter, or even to have a reflex for each one […] It is knowledge in the hands, which comes forth when I make a bodily effort.
[…] I move my legs not as things in space, two-and-a-half feet from my head, but as a power of movement which expands my motor intention. […] But my body is not just one expressive space among others. It is the origin of all other bodies, an expressive movement which causes them to begin to exist as things, under my hands and eyes. […] The body is the medium through which I have a world.
From Part 3, Chapter 1 When I consider my perception, before I start theorizing about it, I never feel as if I am locked inside my own private sensations. My friend Paul and I point out to each other certain details of the landscape. And Paul’s finger, which is pointing to the church-tower, is not a finger-for-me that I interpret as oriented towards a church-tower-for-me. It is Paul’s finger itself which shows me the tower that Paul sees. Similarly, when I make a movement towards some point in the landscape that I can see, I don’t imagine that I am producing in Paul inner visions that are only analogous to mine. On the contrary, I believe that my gestures invade Paul’s world and guide his look. […] This is clear if we understand that the world is the FIELD of our experience, and that we are nothing but a view of the world. […] I am a field, an experience. The day I was born, something started which, even during sleep, can no longer stop to see or not to see, to feel or not to feel, to suffer or be happy, to think or rest from thinking, in short to deal with the world. What started here was not a new set of sensations or states of consciousness, not even a new monad or a new perspective. It was a beginning of a new possibility of situations […] In the home where a child is born, all objects change their significance. They begin to wait for some still-undetermined treatment at the hands of the child. […] I am in a situation because I force my identity into reality by being a body, and by entering the world through that body. The essence of subjectivity is connected with the essence of the body and of the world, because my existence as subjectivity is the same as my existence as a body and as the existence of the world, and because the subject which I am is not separable from this body and this world.
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